Acknowledged to be a relative liberal in domestic policy, Nikita Khrushchev’s foreign policy has always been a complicated mixture of hard-line Cold War repression and conciliatory diplomacy with the United States and NATO.
Co-existence was a subtle way of maintaining the nuclear balance of ‘mutually assured destruction’ while allowing the Soviet Union to pursue a global ideological conflict with the West. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis fits this template. Within the Eastern bloc Khrushchev brutally crushed the Hungarian uprising of 1956 but made concessions to Gomulka in Poland and took a relaxed view of Tito’s Yugoslavia, Albania’s pro-Chinese stance and tolerated – albeit with bemused contempt – the foreign policy experimentation of Romania.
This talk examines the contradictions of Khrushchev's policy of co-existance.
This lecture is part of the 'European Leaders in the Cold War' lecture series, taking place on Fridays from 18 October to 22 November 2024. You may either register for individual lectures or you may choose to register for the entire lecture series at a reduced price.
Please note: this lecture will close to enrolments at 23:59 BST on 15 October 2024.